The paper discusses the sense in which the changes undergone by normative economics in the 20 th century can be said to be progressive. A simple criterion is proposed to decide whether a sequence of normative theories is progressive. This criterion is put to use on the historical transition from the new welfare economics to social choice theory.
makes it clear that normative economics has a teleological rather than a deontological structure, to use the familiar ethical distinction. That is to say, normative economics draws conclusions about the rightness of actions (here, policy arrangements) from a prior investigation of the desirability or "goodness" of economic states of affairs. The definition also encapsulates the claim that normative economics is primarily concerned with evaluations, and only secondarily with recommendations or prescriptions. It allows the economist to assess the functioning of markets without requiring that his evaluations be translated into specific policies. This is a view that I am going to take for granted here, although I realize that some might disagree with it. 1 A second difficulty is that philosophers do not provide obvious guidance for the question I am tackling. They have nearly exclusively discussed progress in relation to science, while rarely contemplating the possibility that there is such a thing as normative science. 2 A further difficulty is that most of the available work on scientific progress deals with the empirical sciences; very little has been written on progress in logic and mathematics. Admittedly, even a suitable notion of conceptual progress for
The third historical stage corresponds roughly to two different forms of normative economics, i.e., social choice theory on the one hand, and public economics on the other.
It is often said that Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951 struck a fatal blow to the new welfare economics. However, this claim cannot be interpreted as saying that social choice theory superseded welfare economics in its traditional role of assessing the working of markets and proposing improvements in terms of corrective taxes and the like. The objective of social choice theory set down by Arrow and further clarified by Sen's Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1970) is to investigate the various abstract methods of evaluating social states. Applications may or may not be market-related and enter the theory mostly by way of examples. From the 1970s onwards, it has been incumbent on the newly created discipline of public economics to discuss market optimality and policy corrections when the markets fail. Public economics has come to absorb most of the applied content of the "new welfare economics" that has survived criticism, so that there are currently two, quite distinct forms of normative economics being practiced in parallel. There may even be more than two if one takes into account inequality theory and poverty theory, which have developed in a relatively autonomous way for the last twenty years or so. Just by itself, this division process is enough to make the transition from the second to the third stage a complicated affair.
There is some evidence that normative economics might be undergoing another change.
The bulk of social choice theory up to the mid-80s, and the whole of public economics roughly up to now, are welfarist. That is to say, they take the information provided by the individuals' utility functions to be necessary and sufficient data for the social evaluation or the public decision. 7 This was the element of continuity between the third stage and the first two, as it were. From the point of view of social ethics, welfarism is a restrictive, and indeed conceptually problematic, principle to adopt. Internal criticism, especially in Sen's later work, as well as the recent dialogue between political philosophers and economists, have helped to bring this point home. Accordingly, some economists have started to reorient social choice theory in a non-welfarist direction.
Sometimes they dispense altogether with utility functions, as they do when analyzing rights. More commonly, they supplement utility information with other sources, as when discussing talents and handicaps, opportunities and "capabilities". This theorizing is covered by fashionable labels such as "economic theories of justice" or "equity", which suggest a philosophical potential that welfare economics never claimed for itself, but there are also hints of implications and even applications, in the economist's specialized sense. So arguably, normative economics is undergoing another metamorphosis. I hasten to add that not everybody in the field -even among those who contribute to reshape it -would agree with the present suggestion. Some "equity" theories are still welfarist in the very sense of this paragraph, 8 and it is a fact that public economists are slow to catch up with the new developments. This said, nobody would deny that normative economics is on the move again and that welfarism is one of the major issues currently under discussion.
We may now be at the right historical distance to decide whether the third stage can be considered a progressive one. The present paper sets itself the more limited task of deciding whether social choice theory was progressive compared with the new welfare economics. Given the dissimilarities in scope I mentioned, the question can only relate to the theoretical outlook of the new welfare economics. A fuller assessment would have to include public economics, but I refrained from taking it into account here because of the complex preliminaries this would involve. While social choice theory emerged all of way of escape, which would consist in letting interpersonal comparisons of utility -be they utilitarian or of other kind -enter the social welfare function. This standard argument grounds the widespread idea that social choice theory superseded the new welfare economics. 10 This is an explicit claim of progress, which explains why I have centred the paper around it. Once it is clarified, I will compare it with the abstractly devised criterion of progress that is mooted in next section. The major finding will be that the standard argument is ill-conceived but that the transition to social choice theory was progressive nonetheless, according to the criterion. It is as if the social choice theorists had seen the right move in the game, while giving for it a wrong reason.
A provisional definition of progress
I start by contrasting intertheoretic with intratheoretic progress. It is perhaps not too difficult to recognize advances made within the confines of a given theory when it is neatly structured -and this is the case of both social choice theory and the new welfare 9 See in particular Hammond (1990) and Drèze (1995) . 10 Few works with the title "welfare economics" were published beyond the 1960's. The strongest ones, which are Feldman's (1980) and Boadway and Bruce's (1984) , mostly consist of an admixture of social choice theory with public economics. The others, like de Graaff's (1957) and Mishan's (1969) , or the later editions of Little (1950) , are outdated restatements of pre-Arrovian welfare economics. economics in its more abstract parts. There is a story of successive clarifications of the two fundamental welfare theorems, and a story of successive refinements of Arrow's impossibility theorem. Both exemplify a form of progress in normative economics, but this is not the form I am interested in diagnosing, unless it interferes with the other form.
Intertheoretic progress is what this paper is about.
When it comes to intertheoretic progress, controversy bursts out, and we can hardly do without an explicit definition. Making a bold attempt, I will say that a shift from a theory T to a theory T' is progressive if: (1) T' provides a solution to at least one unresolved problem of T; (2) T' provides a solution to the main problems that T had already addressed and resolved in its own way; (3) T' raises new problems and manages to solve at least one of them; (4) T does not satisfy the previous conditions with respect to T'. This definition embodies the four ideas of (1) constructive criticism, (2) theoretical continuity, (3) independence, and (4) asymmetry, which are arguably the component parts of the common-sense notion of progress. Notice that if we take T and T' to refer to distinct variants of the same theory, we get a working definition of intratheoretic progress as a particular case. Importantly, the definition does not make particular reference to normative theories. The concept of problem-solving is broad -and vagueenough to apply to them as well as to theories in the empirical sciences and in mathematics. If one construes "problems" as either predictions to be confirmed or facts to be explained, one gets a definition similar to that of a progressive shift in Lakatos (1970).
Actually, something can be learned from the earlier debates surrounding Lakatos's methodology and Popper's (1963, ch. 10 ) related conception, which inspired it. This analogy suggests that there are two possibilities to consider for (1). Either the "unresolved problem" is already recognized by T and is very much like an anomaly accompanying T. Or it is not only solved but also pointed out by T', in which case it is like a novel fact. We might expect both kinds of situations to occur with normative theories. It is arguable that standard ethical rules, such as utilitarianism, are accompanied with anomalies. 11 In normative economics, the many difficulties surrounding the Compensation Principle were treated, at least initially, like anomalies. The case of Arrow's theorem, on which I will elaborate, illustrates the opposite model -that of a novel fact.
Something we learned from the discussions on research programmes is that it is most delicate to construe theoretical continuity appropriately. Instead of (2), I might have required that T' solve all the significant problems already solved by T. This would be asking too much, just as Popper's and Lakatos's famous requirement of non-decreasing content has proved to be too exacting. To say that just one of the earlier problems needs to be solved would be too lax. Accordingly, I remain vague in my clause (2) even if this is not very satisfactory. As for clause (3), it plays the same rôle as the requirement of added content in Popper and Lakatos, that is to say, it serves to exclude ad hoc modifications of T. Lakatos insisted that at least one of the independent predictions should be borne out by the facts, but Popper generally did not make this requirement. 12
My suggestion for (3) parallels Lakatos's condition, and is presumably open to the charge of disguised inductivism that was levelled against it by some Popperians. 13
Here is where the analogy breaks down. The classic requirements of increasing testable content in Lakatos and Popper imply that there are logical relations between successive theories. On the simplest construal, T and T' will share a subset of their logical consequences. Once allowance is made for the fact that theories need auxiliary statements in order to deliver predictions, this straightforward conclusion need not hold anymore. But it is still the case that T and T' will be logically related, although in terms of other statements and in a possibly non-transparent way. Nothing of the sort is implied by the above definition; in fact, T and T' might respond to the same problems using entirely different means. For instance, it can happen that the problems that T was resolving actively are shown not to arise in T'. I would regard this as an instantiation of clause (2). Generally, when the notion of a successful prediction gives way to that of successful problem-solving, much -perhaps too much -flexibility is introduced. The theories in a sequence declared to be progressive according to (1), (2) and (3) may be related to each other in a number of ways. This is why I need (4) in order to include the commonsensical feature of asymmetry into my working definition of progress. The methodology of research programmes makes this clause redundant because of the logical relations already established by the analogues of (1), (2), and (3). The new welfare economics isolated and placed considerable emphasis on the problem of determining the conditions for "the general optimum", which it described as being a point of maximum social welfare. In essence, this was the problem of simultaneous maximizing the members of society's utility functions, given the interdependencies prevailing between producers and consumers and the constraints imposed on their available initial resources. The problem was resolved while assuming nothing about the cardinal measurability and interpersonal comparability of utility -that is, in contemporary language, by invoking only the Pareto Principle. For the present purposes, I will restrict attention to late restatements of this solution by Bergson (1938) , Samuelson, whose Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) expands on Bergson's work, and Lange (1942) , who takes a different approach. These three pieces exemplify the new welfare economics at its best and are thus suitable for a discussion of progress.
Bergson takes the step of discussing the general optimum conditions in terms "the Economic Welfare Function" (1938, p. 312) , which takes as arguments the consumptions of commodities and expenses of factors (e.g., labour) of all the individuals. Symbolically, i = 1,...,n will denote the individuals, x i the vectors of quantities consumed or expended by each i, x = (x 1 ,...,x n ) the allocation vector of the economy, and E = E(x 1 ,..., x n )= E(x) will represent Bergson's function. He makes the standard economic assumptions that E is increasing in individual consumptions and decreasing in individual expenses, and, at some point, that it satisfies the Pareto Principle, which he calls the Fundamental Value Propositions of Individual Preference (1938, p. 318) . Given the Pareto Indifference condition, E factors out in terms of the individual utility functions U i , i.e., there exists another function W that is defined on vectors of utility values and satisfies the equation:
Adding the Strict Pareto condition, which makes the other half of the Pareto Principle, one concludes that W is increasing in each of its arguments. Bergson's contribution was to show that this thin set of assumptions was sufficient to obtain the already known conditions for the general optimum, i.e., that the marginal rates of substitution between commodities are equal from one individual to another, and similarly for the other relevant marginal substitution and transformation rates.
As Bergson also explains, more special conditions that appeared in the past could be traced back to supplementary assumptions imposed on W . For example, some of the marginal statements considered by "the Cambridge economists" -Pigou and his followers -depended on assuming the additive form U 1 (x) + ...+U n (x). This is an important claim for the discussion to come, and a possibly contentious one, so I will provide some textual evidence. Bergson remains cryptic throughout his paper about interpersonal comparisons of utility. He blurs the specific issue they raise by claiming that "value judgments" permeate all and every assumption underlying the Economic Welfare Function E (including the seemingly unproblematic Paretian conditions). The only place where he explicitly connects a "value proposition" with interpersonal comparisons is the passage on the Cambridge function (1938, p. 327 ).
This obvious case does not help one to decide how he construes W more generally. However, once and almost inadvertently, he defines W in a way that precludes interpersonal comparisons of utility -he explains that the U i can represent indifference loci (1938, p. 319) . Samuelson is more informative than Bergson about the critical issue of interpersonal utility comparisons. He generally writes as if W did not make any. For instance, in a passage I will return to later, he claims that "if we were to change from (the) set of cardinal indexes of individual utility U 1 ,..., U n to another set U' 1 ,..., U' n , we should simply change the form of the W function so as to leave all social decisions invariant" (1947, p. 228, notation adapted) . To paraphrase, when (U 1 ,..., U n ) is replaced by the cardinally different, but ordinally equivalent utility profile (U' 1 ,..., U' n ),W will be changed into W' so as to leave the social preference unchanged. This is an exact rendering of Bergson' As in Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) , where this interpretation is presented in more detail, I conclude that Bergson's and Samuelson's early writings sorted out at best one of the two claims involved, i.e., that W did not logically need to make any interpersonal comparisons of utility. At that stage, the two economists had not decided whether or not W should normatively make such comparisons.
Another landmark of the new welfare economics, Lange's (1942) "We may ... doubt that any study of maximal alternatives will actually be useful in studying those aspects of social choice which are directly related to consumer's (and worker's) choice" (1963, p. 37). 16 But there cannot be such a straightforward implication from the initial argument to this bold suggestion. I have stressed that Lange's derivation of the marginal conditions does not depend on using social welfare functions, which makes it immune to Arrow's attempted refutation. One interpretation of Arrow's quote is that he viewed the study of the general optimum as being only a preliminary stage in the construction of a social welfare function. In itself, this view would be hard to defend. Clearly, the marginal conditions have an interest by themselves, even if they do not inform us about the more difficult cases calling for distributional considerations. There is a further reason to doubt that Arrow seriously entertained the strong conclusion suggested by the quote -it would imply that the important work he did to improve on the two welfare theorems was pointless. 17 Having cleared up a possible misunderstanding, I return to the real object of Arrow's critique, which is the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. The ground is now cleared for the third and most problematic step, which is to defend the other conditions in terms of the general objective and privileged interpretations of Bergsonian welfare economics. Arrow (1963, p. 73 ) is disappointingly brief when it comes to this step. Essentially, he contents himself with reminding the reader of the general normative plausibility of the conditions -he had already defended them when introducing them formally. This appears to be an ineffective argumentative move. Given the task that Arrow had set for himself, he should have combined the logical use of his theorem with a specific ad hominem argument, to the effect that Bergson had implicitly accepted Non-Dictatorship and -above all -Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
There are of course no questions with Social Ordering and Weak Pareto since they are contained in Bergson's statement of the W function.
Not surprisingly, the welfare economists plunged into the breach. Little (1952 ), Bergson (1954 , and Samuelson (1967) , conceded that the theorem was perhaps applicable to politics, although they would not feel entirely secure about this, but claimed most strongly that it fell outside their field. "We must conclude that Arrow's work has no relevance to the traditional theory of welfare economics, which culminates in the Bergson-Samuelson formulation", said Little (1952, p. 141) . 19 "I agree with Little in barring Arrow's theorem from welfare economics", added Bergson (1954, p. 247) . 20 "I export Arrow from economics to politics because I do not believe that he has proved the impossibility of the traditional Bergson welfare function of economics", wrote Samuelson in the most famous paper of this series, " Arrow's Mathematical Politics" (1967, p. 42) . 21 Later texts in welfare economics have often taken for granted the political interpretation of the impossibility theorem, as if it provided a satisfactory compromise between Arrow and his opponents. The usual approach goes as follows.
The politically interpreted social welfare function decides which of the many Pareto optima should prevail; then, in accordance with the second welfare theorem, society entrusts the market with the task of implementing the selected optimum. In the end, the social choice of a Pareto optimum is constrained by Arrow's strictures, but this is due to the intervening electoral stage, and not to a possible failure of Paretian economics. 22 This approach concedes only indirect economic relevance to the impossibility theorem.
It takes for granted the arguments promoted by Little, Bergson and Samuelson to downplay the direct applicability of the theorem to social welfare functions as these economists conceived of them. I will review these arguments now.
The profile argument and the controversy of the 1970s
The first objection, which Little (1952) and Samuelson (1967) especially emphasized, was that the very notion of an Arrow function, as defined on a set of many preference profiles, made no sense in welfare economics; and similarly for the conditions put on this function that involve considering several profiles at a time. Indeed, Little and Samuelson argued that welfare economics was restricted to given individual tastes, 19 Baumol's early review of Social Choice and Individual Values had already set the pace: "This result is less disastrous for welfare theory than might first appear" (1952, p. 110) . 20 Bergson's late restatements (1966 and uphold the same strong conclusion. 21 Revisiting the Arrow-Bergson controversy, as well as his own controversy with social choice theorists, Samuelson (1981 Samuelson ( , 1987 came up with essentially the same claim. 22 Feldman's (1980) text illustrates this double-sided approach very clearly. which meant, in Arrow's framework, a unique preference profile. According to the argument, welfare economics comparisons bear only on changes in either the physical variables, such as individual consumptions, or the technological parameters, such as the firms' production possibilities. This can be recast mathematically as follows: the relevant social welfare function is a composed function and not a functional. The standard notation W(U 1 ,..., U n ) equivocates between the two senses because it could mean either:
It is the latter mapping which welfare economists have in mind, and they have no use for the former.
As it turned out from later discussions, the profile argument was not powerful enough to save welfare economics from Arrow's onslaught. To define a "social welfare function" on a set of many preference profiles would be immaterial if the conditions imposed on the function did not entail comparisons between several profiles. Sen (1977 was the first to make this observation, which reduces the scope of the disagreement to the conditions themselves, and specifically to the subclass of those Ordering and Weak Pareto do not need replacing because they are formulated identically for either one profile or many at a time. Around 1976-1980 the three novel conditions displaced Arrow's initial ones as the focus of attention, and a fierce controversy took place between those social choice theorists who had promoted them and Samuelson, who acted as the only spokesman for the welfare economics camp. 26 Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) have reappraised the controversy in full detail, and I will now report on some salient conclusions from this study.
The first variant condition, Single Profile Modified Domain, decomposes into the assumption of a rich domain of physical quantities and that of a given preference profile of individual preference that satisfies the standard economic assumptions. Its purpose was to create a common ground between the opposite camps. The third condition, Single Profile Non-Dictatorship, was more contentious. Commonsensically, dictatorship relative to a given profile is less unpalatable than it would be on a set of many profiles.
However, after brief skyrmishes around this issue, 27 the welfare economists conceded Single Profile Non-Dictatorship. The controversy focused almost exclusively on Single Profile Neutrality, whose technical rôle in the new framework corresponds to that assigned to Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the original one. This condition stipulates that if x and y are located on the individuals' preference maps exactly as are two other states w and z , then x and y may be replaced by w and z in the social preference, i.e., society ranks the first pair exactly as it does the second. Even for just one profile, this is a formidable assumption to make, as Samuelson was quick to point out.
Take an "ethical observer" (Samuelson's personification of social preference) who must allocate 100 chocolates between two individuals: "What is the meaning of [Single Profile Neutrality] in this context? It says, "If it is ethically better to take something (say 1 chocolate or, alternatively, say 50 chocolates) from Person 1 who had all the chocolates in order to give to Person 2 who had none, then it must be ethically preferable to give all the chocolates to Person 2''. One need not be a doctrinaire egalitarian to be speechless at this requirement. Is it "reasonable'' to put on an ethical system such a straightjacket? Few will agree that it is '' (1977, p. 83) .
To connect Samuelson's example with the abstract condition, denote by x and y the allocation vectors (100, 0) and (99, 1), where the components refer to numbers of chocolates consumed by 1 and 2, in that order. Society has the same preferences between x and y as between z=x= (100, 0) and w=(0,100), hence if it prefers (99, 1) to (100, 0), it must also prefer (0, 100) to (100,0). Evidently, this conclusion defeats the egalitarian intent of the initial preference statement. No more than this little example is sufficient to deprive Single Profile Neutrality from its normative appeal as far as distributive issues are concerned, i.e., for welfare economics. Although this would have 26 It is surprising that Bergson and Little remained silent on such an important occasion The welfare economists could also rely on the support of Mayston (e.g., 1982 ), but his work was unfortunately disregarded. 27 See Little (1952, section 2) and Bergson (1954, p. 237). been possible, Samuelson did not adapt his counterexample to the political context. Such restraint is consistent with his long-standing view that Arrow's work is at least relevant to "mathematical politics". 28
Persuasive as it is, Samuelson's example was not up the challenge posed by the single profile impossibility theorem, since the crucial question for the welfare economists was not to decide whether they should accept Single Profile Neutrality, but whether they had accepted it, possibly without noticing. In order to compare this condition with the welfare function W(U 1 (x),..., U n (x)), I represent the given profile of preference relations in Single Profile Modified Domain by the set of all ordinal transforms ( 1 oU 1 ,..., n oU n ) of a given utility profile (U 1 ,..., U n ) , where the i are increasing real functions and the U i satisfy the relevant economic restrictions. Once this notational step is performed, it turns out that there are three possibilities for W(U 1 (x),..., U n (x)), each with distinctive consequences:
) for all possible 1 ,..., n . Here one and the same W is employed for the initial profile and all of its transforms. It can be checked that on this construal, W satisfies Single Profile Neutrality. Hence, from the single profile theorem, it is dictatorial.
(2) Weaker invariance properties than (1), for example: (U 1 (x) ,..., U n (x)) = W'( 1 oU 1 (x),..., n oU n (x)) for all sets of 1 ,..., n , with W' being defined by this equation. In other words, there are not just one, but infinitely many W functions, one for each set of transforms, all of them delivering the same social preference and even the same numerical values. This is an invariance statement again, but widely different from those in (1) and (2). On this construal, the W functions do not 28 Turning Samuelson against himself, Pollak (1979) argued that if Single Profile Neutrality is objectionable in welfare economics, it may also be in relation to political or judicial rules. 29 However, the maximin just satisfies Weak Pareto, not the full strength of the Pareto Principle.
satisfy Single-Profile Neutrality, and it is possible to find non-dictatorial examples to meet the remaining conditions. Among the three conceptions, only (2) involves interpersonal comparisons of utility.
The two examples in (2) correspond to familiar comparisons, i.e., those of utility levels (for the maximin) and of utility differences (for utilitarianism). By contrast, (1) and (2) deny interpersonal utility comparisons, but emphatically, in distinctive ways. Construal (3) exactly formalizes Bergson's 1938 claim that the social welfare function depends on indifference loci alone, which amounts to denying any interpersonal utility comparisons.
Construal (1) involves more than this denial. It also imposes welfarism in the following heavy form. Not only are utility data sufficient to determine the social preference, irrespective of the physical descriptions of the states, but the mapping from these utility data to the social preference is fixed, whether utility data are computed with (U 1 ,..., U n ) or any authorized transform. Very roughly speaking, Single Profile Neutrality may be decomposed into a denial of interpersonal utility comparisons and another component, which I will refer to as strong welfarism. A crucial point, which Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) spell out formally, is that the full force of Single Profile Neutrality, not only its denial of utility comparisons, is needed in order to derive dictatorship. The latter does not follow from (3) alone.
The previous taxonomy explains why Samuelson and framework, the only way to avoid dictatorship is to allow for interpersonal comparisons of utility functions. Accordingly, the older economists' question of whether such comparisons should be made gave way to the more specialized one of finding which were the appropriate ones, given varying normative commitments towards distribution.
This led to sophisticated comparisons between utility comparisons, and especially, to a famous parallel between the Rawlsian-like leximin and utilitarian rules. Important as this work was and still is, it proceeded from a premature rejection, and effectively a misrepresentation, of the new welfare economists' contribution.
Individualism and the tradition of the field
The last significant point made by the welfare economists, notably Little (1952) and Bergson (1954) , is that the functions E or W should not be interpreted as expressing the society's ordering but only as an ordering relative to the society. But then, whose ordering is it? Arrow's opponents insisted that it must be a person's. The welfare economist, they claimed, is very much like a consultant. He counsels officials who are to make large-scale decisions. He also counsels ordinary citizens who are willing to employ him in order to decide, say, whether or not they will support a tax reform. Whichever is the case, the argument continues, welfare analysis relates to somebody like you and me, not to a nebulous collective entity. The individual client communicates his piecemeal evaluative judgments to the welfare economist, who will summarize them into an ordering. This conclusion is unproblematic because the usual rationality considerations apply here to concrete individuals and are normatively compelling at this level.
This forceful answer would seem to cut the ground under Arrow's feet, and actually preclude the development of social choice theory altogether. I am not aware of an 31 Parks (1976, p. 450 ) has a very clear statement of the dilemma, and it is reiterated in Kemp and Ng (1977) , Roberts (1980, p. 449) , Sen (1986 Sen ( , p. 1149 , with qualifications), Hammond (1991, p. 226) . However, the last writer takes a different stand in Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004) . 32 See the work surveyed by d 'Aspremont (1985) , Sen (1986) , Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998) , Bossert and Weymark (2004) . explicit rebuttal in the literature, which makes it worthwhile to offer one here. One version of the argument is easy to reject because it involves a serious confusion about methodological individualism. The welfare economists claimed in effect that collective entities ("the community as such", Bergson, 1954, p. 243) did not exist. But it has been argued, I think, convincingly that methodological individualism is not the thesis that collectives do not exist. It is rather the (weaker) thesis that they cannot be automatically endowed with well-defined aims or objectives. Methodological individualism is a way of allocating the burden of proof. When it comes to, say, firms or nations, the burden of proof is on whoever claims that there is such a thing as the firm's objective function, or the nation's long-term interests. From this cursory discussion, I conclude that methodological individualism supports, if anything at all, the programme of investigating the conditions under which collective objectives can be constructed from individual objectives as the relevant data. This, broadly speaking, is the programme of social choice theory.
Here is a further counter-argument. Even granting the welfare economists' premiss that the social welfare ordering is a person's ordering, there are difficulties for their position.
It amounts to discarding all of Arrow's conditions but one, i.e., Social Ordering. A priori, the individual client may be of any ethical type. He might not even accept the Pareto Principle, which would stop the analysis at the level of E without W being derivable.
But if this is the case, what rôle is left for welfare economists? They are reduced to the menial task of teaching their clients how to maximize an objective function under predetermined constraints, whatever this function and these constraints may be. Surely, welfare economists have a higher opinion of their field. They write as if they have some theory of what counts as a suitable social objective; in particular, they never seriously envisage E being other than Paretian. What leads them astray here may be the implicit assumption that to form an ordering from a client's data is a trivial step. To be true to the "economist as consultant" picture, they would have to take into account the construction of the social welfare objective. It is at this prior stage that their traditional commitments, such as the Pareto Principle, enter into the picture. But if the individual client scenario is so enriched, social choice theory becomes relevant. Arrow's conditions, or rather the corresponding single-profile conditions, become interesting prima facie.
They may be dismissed at the end of the day, but there is now some sense in saying that they belong to theoretical welfare economics. 33
The welfare economists' arguments relied not only on the two lines of argument which I have disposed of, but also on invoking the tradition of their field. For instance, in the same quoted passage, Bergson wrote: "I have thought here to make explicit that this follows simply from the very nature of the discipline" (1954, p. 247) . For all I know, this remarkable declaration clashes with the history of the subject. Admittedly, the notion of the economist as counselling individuals was commonplace in pre-war economics. But I do not think that anybody at that time believed that the whole of welfare economics could be reorganized around this single theme, especially when counselling was construed as narrowly as it was in Bergson and Little. 34 There is ample evidence that: (a) in a number of cases, welfare economists did not have any counselling scenario in mind; (b) when they did, they were prepared to extend their notion of a client to the collective entity, whatever that meant for them; 35 (c) they were not taking social welfare orderings as given, but constructing them, at least coarsely or in outline. 36
To summarize the point bluntly, the new welfare economics, in the BergsonianSamuelsonian formulation of a social welfare function, was groping after something like the social choice aggregation problem. Arrow puts it in this way: "Social choice theory 
A word on the Compensation Principle
The Compensation Principle of the new welfare economics provides a link with social choice theory that has attracted more attention than the Arrow-Bergson connection.
However, it is conceptually less significant than the latter for a reason that needs spelling out. The critique of the Compensation Principle does not have to rely on using 34 Robbins (1932) might have. But he is not a welfare economist, and his positions were often rejected by the new welfare economists for being too sktechy and too extreme. 35 Evidence for (b) can be found in Lange (1942) , and even more clearly in the debate over the second welfare theorem and the economic theory of socialism. 36 Clear evidence for (c) can be found even in Bergson (1938, p. 323) . the impossibility theorem, unlike the critique of Bergsonian welfare economics, which absolutely requires it.
As is well known, the compensation tests attempted to extend the range of welfare judgments permitted by the Pareto Principle by taking into account the possibility of the gainers' compensating the losers. The Kaldor-Hicks test was inconsistent in that it led to cycles, actually obvious cycles of order two, but Scitovsky claimed that his more sophisticated "double test" would remedy this defect. Arrow argued that the Scitovsky test was also inconsistent. The logical skeleton of his refutation is this. The binary relation implied by the Scitovsky test is incomplete; a natural way to make it complete is to declare two states x and y indifferent with each other if the test is conclusive neither for x against y, nor for y against x. However, indifference defined that way turns out to be intransitive, as a three-alternative example demonstrates (1963, p. 45 It is instructive to compare the two arguments envisaged here with Chipman and Moore's (1978) detailed refutation. These authors establish that each test, including Scitovsky's, is cyclical by constructing general equilibrium positions. Arrow's numerical example and the suggested refutation through the impossibility theorem deliver the same conclusion without attempting to satisfy this economically relevant constraint on the set of social states. Chipman and Moore's argument is more telling, but it is also more remote from social choice theory. It is disappointing to conclude that the Compensation Principle does not fit in with the present discussion of progress in normative economics.
Social choice theory and the conditions of progress
I return now to the abstract criterion of progress by relating it to the main case study. In section 5, the word "problem" has come to mean two different things. I argued that the general problem of aggregating individual utility functions was part of the conceptual background of the new welfare economics, even if its spokesmen did not recognize it.
Besides, there was the specific problem created by the impossibility theorem, which was of course invented by social choice theory, but must also count as a problem for the new welfare economics, given that the general problem was in the air. I will discuss the specific problem exclusively because the general problem is too vague to permit precise comparisons with the four requirements. Despite this persuasive objection I will argue that (1) is fulfilled after all. My argument depends on a crucial move -in order to describe the specific problem for T and its solution in T', I propose to adopt not the perspective of T' at the time of the controversy between T and T', but today's perspective on both theories, thus taking full benefit of hindsight. We now understand Arrow's impossibility theorem and its single profile variant much better than in the 1970s. The specific problem for the new welfare economics has been shown to have a trilemma structure, and its solution accordingly to involve two possibilities, i.e., to make interpersonal comparisons of either utility values or of other individual data (the latter is equivalent to rejecting strong welfarism). 37 I will be able to conclude that requirement (1) The second point is not so easy to argue as the first. In retrospect, I have found only one early piece in social choice theory that belongs to the unexplored line, i.e., Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) article on the "equivalent-egalitarian" criterion, which in effect pursues Samuelson's unfinished 1977 analysis. 39 This work borders on the fourth stage of normative economics because of its implicit rejection of welfarism, and it is indeed the fourth stage which brought out its potential clearly. Other attempts to elaborate on the unexplored line are recent and quite clearly not limited to social choice theory. 40 I conclude that this theory is responsible for correctly stating the problem, but not the whole of its solution. In order to dispose of this complication, I will modify my tentative criterion of progress in the last section. and y , respectively, to the origin. Kemp and Ng (1977) mistook Samuelson's procedure for a comparison between cardinal utilities, a confusion that Mayston (1982) exposed without convincing them. 38 Pazner (1979), Mayston (1982) , Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1990) , Fleurbaey and Maniquet (in particular 1996 and .
39 An allocation (x 1 ,...,x n ) is egalitarian-equivalent if there is a benchmark vector x such that each individual i is indifferent between x and his component x i in the allocation. When x refers to the total resources, Pareto-optimal egalitarian-equivalent allocations enter Samuelson's 1977 example as special cases. This is shown in Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005, section 3) . 40 Fleurbaey and Maniquet (see their 1999) have recently proposed solutions in the style of the unexplored line. They are expressly intended to bridge the gap with public economics, and if only for this reason, it would be implausible to locate them in social choice theory exclusively.
Both to support the argument that requirement (1) is met and to reach the same conclusion for (2) and (3), I will pause and clarify the sense in which, generally speaking, social choice theory can be said to resolve problems. Many in the field are concerned mostly with exploring the compatibility or otherwise of given normative assumptions, without taking sides strongly for or against them. They might point out that an assumption is apparently acceptable or open to criticism, but would normally refrain from entering a sustained normative debate. The problems they are interested in take as their data some list of "axiomatic" conditions and their solutions take the form of either an impossibility theorem (e.g., Arrow's five conditions are incompatible) or a positive characterization (e.g., utilitarianism is characterized by such-and-such list).
With this formal interpretation of its task, social choice theory cannot regard the latter class of results as being more important than the former. It is true that impossibility theorems call for further investigations, while positive characterizations sound definitive, but this very argument could be invoked to say that the former are deeper than the latter. Now, beside this, currently predominant, formal notion of problemsolving, there is another one, which makes the normative discussion a very substantial part of the social choice theorist's activity. For a significant minority group -which I would argue includes Arrow and Sen themselves -solutions should be given at the substantial level of normative decisions made for or against a given set of conditions, while the formal statements play the role of preliminary groundwork. With this more commonsensical interpretation of its task, social choice theory will deemphasize impossibility theorems; positive characterizations are what matters more. 41 After contrasting the two groups with each other, I hasten to add that they overlap massively in their ordinary work. Some contributions are clearly purely formal, others are clearly substantial or at least offered as such, but a good deal of the problem-solving activity in the field falls in between.
This sketch needs comparing with what we know of the new welfare economists' attitude towards normative commitments. They were wary of certain "value judgments" and willing to indulge in others. They took the Pareto Principle to be both normatively commendable and indispensable, and they regarded judgments of interpersonal comparisons as being both normatively dubious and dispensable. These two substantial commitments defined the range of acceptable problems for which solutions could be sought. Within this substantially predetermined range, solutions were mostly offered at the formal level, as is apparent in Bergson, Samuelson, Lange and their followers.
Comparisons between the new welfare economics and social choice theory will not be difficult to implement if one is careful to limit them to problem-solving activities of a given type, either formal or substantial.
This warning puts into proper perspective both requirements (1) and (2). If one reads
Bergson and Samuelson's function as an entirely formal concept, the problem it raises can be compared with the entirely formal solution "make interpersonal comparisons of some kind". If (I think more appropriately) one interprets the function substantially, it will have to include the denial of interpersonal utility comparisons, and the more substantial solution becomes relevant: "make interpersonal comparisons of a non-utility sort, e.g., of individual indifference curves". With this warning in mind, and possibly taking into account the contribution of public economics, it is straightforward to check that requirement (2) is fulfilled.
Similarly, both formal and substantial resolutions are appropriate when considering (3).
This requirement is easily satisfied by mentioning the problems in "mathematical politics" that social choice theorists have both raised and solved, from the early revival of the theory of committees in the 1950's to the current attempts to combine a description of the political process with a market equilibrium analysis. These problems were outside the initial range of the new welfare economics, and not only outside its range as it was tactically redefined once Arrow's theorem became known. It is fair to recall at this juncture that modern social choice theory results also from Black's Theory of Committees and Elections (1958) and earlier work on the same topic. Alternatively, one could stay even closer to Arrow's theorem and mention the variant proved by Gibbard (1973) , a justly famous result which opened up a whole new area of work -i.e., the nonmanipulability of social choice decisions. 42 Given today's wide deployment of normative economics, it is not difficult to argue that the asymmetry condition (4) is fulfilled. On the weak reading of this condition, it is satisfied if the new welfare economics fails to solve an unresolved problem of either social choice theory or public economics, or fails to solve some problems that these theories do resolve, or fails to raise and eventually solve a problem of its own that these theories are silent about. On the strong reading, all three failures would be required. The weak reading seems to be preferable; if not, the criterion of progress would very rarely 42 A methodological dispute is likely to take place in connection with this and related examples. Some writers in normative economics (e.g., Fleurbaey, 1996) believe that non-manipulability, and others implementation concepts, belong to an area different from normative economics. As they construe it, the latter is concerned solely with norms and evaluations, not with the way in which these can be achieved in the economy. It seems that normative economics must be concerned with implementation issues, if only because they count among the considerations weighing for or against evaluative criteria.
apply. However, in the present instance, the failure is multiple, and there is no need to decide between the weak and strong reading.
The assumptions of welfare economics and the fourth stage of normative economics
Although the main point has already been argued, i.e., that the third stage was a progressive one, I would like to take a broader view of my topic and briefly reexamine the basic assumptions of welfare economics. As will become apparent, the point is to relate them to current work, i.e., the fourth stage of normative economics. This will lead me further to clarify the sense in which the third stage was progressive.
Welfare economics relies on conceptually loaded assumptions that have become better and better understood, and more and more heatedly criticized, with the passing of time.
The following list attempts to summarize them. I state them in terms of the ideal concept of normative economics that welfare economics is supposed to encapsulate.
(I) Normative economics is an exclusively teleological theory. That is to say, it will select a notion of the social good, and it will make all its evaluations and derived prescriptions dependent on this chosen notion. (VIII) The index is not comparable from one individual to another. This is a rough picture, but it is sufficient for the conceptual discussion. 44 Welfare economists generally do not distinguish (V) from (VI) because they take "revealed preference theory" for granted. So, the statement corresponding to (V) and (VI) jointly goes like this in welfare economics:
"A person's welfare map is defined to be identical with his preference map -which indicates how he would choose between different situations, if he were given the opportunity for choice. To say that his welfare would be higher in A than in B is thus no more than to say that he would choose A rather than B, if he were allowed to make the choice" (de Graaff, 1957, p. 5) . 45
All of these assumptions can be, and indeed have been, called into question, either jointly or separately. Take (V) and (VI) together. Of course, welfare economists know that maximizing behaviour in the revealed preference sense does not have the same meaning as maximizing behaviour in the welfare sense. What they intend to say is only that the former can serve as a measure of the other for the purpose of the theory.
Presumably, this is the reason why de Graaff employs the word "defined" in the previous quote. Then, domain considerations should come to the forefront. The (purely extensional) coincidence of the two kinds of behaviour can only be justified by appealing to the restrictive notion of social states in welfare economics. This means that we should really consider (V) and (VI) jointly with (IV). But even in this charitable reading, the claim is more than dubious. Suppose that I have to choose between various baskets of apples and bananas, a matter relevant to the "economic" notion of a social state. From the fact that x is my chosen basket, and y is not, the welfare economist still cannot infer that my welfare would be lower in y than it is in x. This is a non-sequitur. They may be all sorts of reasons why I choose x instead of y, not all of them have to do with my welfare. Quite trivially, my tastes for apples and bananas might induce me to choose a basket with, say, too many bananas for my welfare. Some will perhaps be tempted to reply that non-welfare reasons show up as violations of the consistency of choices, but this would be a gratuitous assumption to make. A more standard reply is this. One cannot say that I am choosing too many bananas for my welfare if I really choose to 44 It has sometimes been said that welfare economics needed only to make assumptions about variations in individual and social welfare; see Little (1950) . I discard this line of analysis partly for simplicity, partly because it does not seem very plausible to investigate variations in a quantity without saying what the quantity refers to. 45 Compare with related statements in Boadway and Bruce (1984, p. 8) , Little (1950) , Mishan (1969, p. 23-25). have this basket. But this is tantamount to saying that, after all, welfare is the same thing as choice -a claim that was discarded at the outset as implausible. Notice that the familiar contention, "people are the best judges of their own interest", is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that choices provide a measure of welfare. The claim may be true without the people's good judgment surfacing in their choices.
One way or another, the arguments just sketched have been made several times. 46 What I want to stress in connection with the present analysis of progress is that this seemingly commonsensical critique has entered normative economics only recently. It is not well taken by social choice theory, which generally has little to contribute to the interpretation of the preference concept. For most social choice theorists, preferences are just preferences, whatever that means; and if they are pressed to provide an interpretation, they might very well follow the welfare economist into the trap of "defining" welfare by choice. 47 It is only in the work currently pursued about nonstandard indexes of welfare, especially in connection with Sen's (1985) "functionings" and "capabilities", that the critique above has become broadly understood.
A different (and more sophisticated) critique of welfare economics results from focusing on (IV) and (V), while putting (VI) aside. To relate an economic notion of welfare to any concept of preference raises possible objections. Sen's (e.g., 1979 Sen's (e.g., , 1985 arguments usually proceed by considering actual preferences -"tastes" in Arrow's terminology.
But it is possible to introduce a notion of improved preferences that is located somewhere between "tastes" and "values", i.e., preferences for the individual's own good. 48
These issues are often discussed in connection with the already mentioned concept of welfarism. In Sen and others, it refers to the view that individual utility data are both necessary and sufficient to form an index of social welfare. This is also the definition employed thus far this paper. It has the defect of trading on an unspecified notion of "utility", and in the present context of conceptual discussion, it seems preferable to fix a more substantial conception of welfarism, as claiming that individual welfare data are both necessary and sufficient to form an index of social welfare. Then, welfarism becomes identical with assumption (III) in the list. The argument against sufficiency can 46 Some were already made by the philosophers (not the economists!) participating in the conference Human Values and Economic Policy (1967) . Further occurrences are, among others, Broome (1978) , Sen (1985) , Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998) . 47 This happened several times over at recent meetings of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. 48 This sense of preference is suggested by the important work of Griffin (1986) and Harsanyi (1977) . Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998, p. 388-401) follow the same direction.
be made in terms of socially undesirable aspirations, as in Hare's (1976) fanatic example or in Sen's (1970) Paretian Liberal paradox. The case against necessity is not so straightforward to argue, and might necessitate considering the pitfalls of the Pareto Principle in the uncertainty context, which would involve assumption (VII) in the discussion. 49 I skip the discussion of the more basic commitments (I) and (II), which Sen and his followers have also come to question. Roughly speaking, it involves either changing (II) to enlarge the notion of social good beyond that of social welfare, 50 or replacing in (I) "to form a notion of the social objective" by "to evaluate social states", so as to make room for deontological considerations. 51
This bird-eye review was meant to support two methodological claims. First, as already emphasized, it was only long after the early stages of social choice theory that the argument against the new welfare economics was properly sorted out. I mentioned Arrow's occasional anticipation of a far-reaching critique of the new welfare economics, i.e., a critique which would hit not only the Bergsonian Economic Welfare Function, but the Paretian core of welfare economics. Whatever Arrow's intentions were in 1951 and in 1963, I do not think that he had the conceptual means of pursuing such a critique. The current discussions help to formulate it more appropriately. Second, there is a claim that is in a sense reciprocal to the previous one. The current discussions are usefully reorganized within the framework of a step-by-step refutation of the new welfare economics -even though the latter is old hat for many of today's readers. Precisely because they embody an intermediary stage of critical thinking, the Arrovian and postArrovian theories of the 1950-1980s are not a good polemical target to choose for "postwelfarist" writers. It is better to shoot at a theory which is blunter about its conceptual commitments.
This brief excursion into the fourth stage illustrates a relevant generality about the pace of progress in normative economics. Not only has this pace proved to be painfully slow, but it appears to follow a lag pattern. The most important semantic findings about the second stage are becoming available only now that normative economics has entered its fourth stage. In a rough parallel, section 7 has argued that the logical problem surrounding the Bergson-Samuelson function has been sorted out only recently, and that the fourth stage perspective inspired some of its solutions. Progress in normative economics can be appreciated only by comparing non-successive theories. Such lags are perhaps not surprising given the problem-based criterion adopted for assessing progress.
49 On this line of objection see, e.g., Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998) . 50 Presumably, the work on "capabilities" follows this line of teleological, non-welfarist thinking. 51 As in the work on rights stemming from another part of Sen's work (e.g., 1981) .
Indeed, problems have a life of their own, some of them being quickly clarified, others dragging on for years.
Conclusions and qualifications
By way of conclusion, I return to the tentative definition of progress, and discuss qualifications and refinements of the four requirements. To echo the last comment, I
propose to reformulate (1) as follows: T' points out a problem that is unresolved in T, and this problem is resolved by T' either alone or in collaboration with some T'' succeeding T'. This generalization seems to be unproblematic, given that the criterion aims only at making the commonsense notion of progress more precise, and it is intuitive that a theory is progressive with respect to another, not only if it contains the full clarification and resolution of a problem raised by the latter, but also if it prepares this final stage decisively. It would be interesting to collect scientific cases of the lagged manifestations of progress, but the growth-of-knowledge literature seems to have neglected the possibility that normative economics illustrates.
I have already said that the unresolved problem in (1) may be like an anomaly for T or like a novel fact pointed out by T'. Boldly generalizing on the irrelevance of Compensation Tests for the present inquiry, I tend to believe that cases of the first kind will be scarcer than those of the second kind in normative disciplines. This means that the assessment in these disciplines will always be controversial, since one must expect the T theorists to deny what the T' theorists claim, i.e., that there is a problem for T.
The standard philosophy-of-science suggestion to decide between the two camps would be to resort to an external decision procedure, and the latter would go roughly like this.
Investigate the formal languages of T and T', as well as the intended interpretations of sentences produced by T and T' using their respective languages. If the problem made explicit by T' with its own syntactical and semantic resources could also have been formulated in the language of T, and if once so formulated, this problem would have fallen within the range of interpretations intended by T, then you may conclude that it was a theoretical problem for T; otherwise, the problem belongs to T' exclusively. To some extent this abstract description fits the case study. At least, this is how I started discussing Arrow's conditions and whether they apply to the new welfare economics. However, once confronted with a crucial, but syntactically and semantically equivocal expression, "the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function", I had to enter the economists' "conversations", as the fashionable slogan goes. Samuelson ended up restricting the initial sense of his welfare function, and one may wonder whether this shift was not in part the result of the social choice theorists' intervening work, in the same way as Bergson and Little altered the scope of welfare economics in reaction to Arrow's criticisms. This is a case where the semantics and even the syntax of T are adjusted after the fact to those of T', and it prevents the procedure from delivering any relevant information, since the T theorists blur comparisons with T'. I would expect such disturbing phenomena to take place often in normative disciplines. The only way to disentangle them is to subject the external decision procedure to a pragmatic and rhetoric analysis, as I did sketchily here and more thoroughly in Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) .
This said, my approach is not pragmatic or rhetoric from the start contrary to McCloskey's (1994) approach or Dascal's (1998) I move on to requirement (2), which I propose to qualify in the same way as I did (1): T' or subsequent theories T'' provide solutions to the main problems that T had already addressed and resolved in its own way. There is a persisting difficulty with the condition that T' or T'' solve the main problems of T, instead of all the problems of T. I said that the standard requirement is too strong to make the methodology of research programmes really applicable, but I must concede that my weakening is not only vague but even possibly inconsistent. It is conceivable that T' solve the main problems of T, while T'' solve the main problems of T', but not those of T. In this case, the "more progressive than" relation would be intransitive, which sounds absurd. Thus far, I have found no way out of this unpleasant dilemma.
Here is another less apparent difficulty for (2). The requirement that T' or T'' continue to solve the main problems of T is strong enough to ensure continuity, but not to exclude that dubious resolutions will be perpetuated. In the empirical sciences the corresponding requisite -roughly, that T' recovers most of the corroborated content of 52 Dascal (1998) has recently proposed a method of studying scientific controversies and he has already illustrated it in economics in Dascal and Cremaschi (1999) .
T -ensures in principle that what is common to T and T' is also what is valuable. Of course, the contrast must not be overdone: corroboration is arguably never definitive, and some problem resolutions can be. But there remains a substantial dissimilarity, and it might indicate that only progress "in the small", not progress "in the large" as in grand science, is really feasible for normative disciplines. Given the conceptual difficulties -or rather, the mass of confusions -which social choice theory unconsciously borrowed from the new welfare economics, the progress from one to the other is more limited than even my already qualified account suggests.
Concerning (3), I will only mention that this condition does not insist on originality, at least in the following sense. It is sufficient if traditional conceptions are brought by T' to bear on the given problem. The way in which public economics has repeatedly dragged the time-honoured rule of utilitarianism into welfare discussions is a case to the point.
There is an analogy between the claim made here about originality and a view that surfaced in earlier philosophy-of-science discussions of novel facts. Against Lakatos's "temporal" view of evidence, it was argued -successfully, I believe -that a new theory could be corroborated by evidence already known before that theory came into existence. 53 Requirement (4) was said to be easily met, a feature which makes the present study perhaps unrepresentative of economics generally. Outside normative economics proper, the field abounds in cases in which the first three conditions would apply more or less plausibly, but the fourth one would not be met. Consider the recent "non-expected" utility theories of risky choice. They solve a number of problems -some of them empirical, others normative -that were left open in von Neumann-Morgenstern theory. However, the smooth analysis of risk-attitudes provided by the latter has not found a full counterpart in the former. There are simple questions relative to insurance coverage or portfolio diversification that they cannot answer well. Perhaps they will do so in due course, but given their current state, one could argue that they are progressive only by adopting the weak (disjunctive) interpretation of (4). 54
There is a warning I should finally make, lest the contribution of this paper be misunderstood. Welfare economics died, or rather disintegrated progressively, for many different reasons, not all of which are connected with the emergence of a progressive alternative theory. The pre-war controversy on market socialism could not be resolved by means of the fundamental welfare theorems, nor more generally in terms of the 53 See Zahar (1983) and Worrall (1985) . 54 The putative example of progress constituted by nonexpected utility theories was discussed by Mongin (1988) along Lakatosian lines; it has been usefully re-examined by Guala (2000) . existing welfare economics; this was perhaps the first serious warning about its limitations. The post-war years witnessed an increasing discontent with its policy conclusions, not only because of the pervasiveness of externalities, but also because "second-best" considerations rose to the forefront. So the achievements of the new welfare economics proved dubious even to those who were not impressed by Arrow and his new style of theorizing. This suggests that one should be clear about the following distinction. There is a difference between claiming that the four conditions apply with some dose of success to the historical development of normative economics, and claiming that these conditions state the causal factors accounting for this development.
The rational reconstruction of normative economics I have attempted is itself evaluative, and does not by itself purport to make causality claims. But it suggests links that could possibly be turned into causality claims, and it is left for the historian to decide on that remaining issue.
